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# Tight metaphors vs. deadly metonymies: a further rebuttal of Iwata's bipartite adjectival resultatives



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## ABSTRACT

This short paper is a rebuttal of Iwata's (2014) criticisms of Broccias (2013). By using Iwata's (2014) own paraphrase for path conceptualisation, it is shown that path conceptualisation is not impossible in Type B resultatives and, at the same time, that path conceptualisation is not always active in Type A resultatives. Further, it is argued that Iwata's (2014) criticism of the notion of "tight links" is based on a series of paradoxes, which throw his theory into disarray. Finally, it is shown that the notion of "tight links" is needed in the analysis of the resultative phrase *to one's death* because the notion of metonymy to which Iwata (2014) appeals is problematic. Thus, the need for a more flexible approach, based on blending operations, is highlighted.

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## 1. The controversy so far

Iwata (2006) distinguishes between two types of adjectival resultatives construction, namely Type A,<sup>1</sup> see (1a), and Type B,<sup>2</sup> see (1b).

- (1) a. Sam kicked Bill black and blue. (Type A)  
b. He spread the butter thin. (Type B)

Essentially, the difference between Type A and Type B is whether the verb or, rather, the construction without the resultative phrase entails a change of state. In Type A, the verb does not; in Type B it does.

Among the differences that Iwata (2006) claims exist between the two Types is that Type A does not allow multiple resultative phrases (RPs), see (2a), while Type B does, see (2b). (The RPs in (2) have been bracketed for the sake of clarity.)

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<sup>1</sup> Type A is also called "argument structure resultative construction" or "argument resultative" in Iwata (2006) – because it is regarded as an instantiation of Goldberg's (1995) argument structure resultative construction – "argument structure construction-based resultative" in Iwata (2008), "fixed string resultative" in Iwata (2014).

<sup>2</sup> Type B is also called "AP-adjunct resultative construction" in Iwata (2006), "adjectival "further specifying" result state construction" in Iwata (2008), "AP-addition resultative" in Iwata (2014). Importantly, Type B is regarded as a separate construction from Goldberg's (1995) argument structure resultative construction.

- (2) a. \* Sam kicked Bill [black and blue] [out of the room].  
 b. He spread the butter [thin] [on the bread].

Pivotal to Iwata's (2006) explanation for the differences in behaviour between the two Types are

- a) the claim that change of state is not conceptualised as a property path (i.e. in translational motion terms) in Type B;  
 b) the claim that the adjectival resultative phrase in Type B is an adjunct.

Iwata (2006) thus argues that Type B resultatives with multiple RPs, unlike Type A ones, do not violate Goldberg's (1995) Unique Path Constraint, which prohibits two RPs coding two paths related to two different conceptual landscapes from occurring in the same resultative construction. In (2a), a property path change pertaining to Bill's becoming *black and blue* and a physical path, *out of the room*, are evoked; since the two paths pertain to two different landscapes, the two RPs *black and blue* and *out of the room* cannot occur in the same construction. By contrast, in (2b), the property change hinted at by *thin* is taken not to be conceptualised as a path and, hence, a physical path RP such as *on the bread* can co-occur with the RP *thin*.

Iwata's (2006) paper concludes with an Appendix where he attacks Broccias (2003), whose approach to resultatives he deems riddled with problems and ultimately incapable of accounting for differences such as the one in (2). Broccias (2013) refutes Iwata's (2006) criticisms, showing not only that Broccias's (2003) model is compatible with Iwata's (2006) observations but also that Iwata's (2006) as well as Iwata's (2008) model is built on questionable grounds. In particular, Broccias (2013) argues that neither of the assumptions in a) and b) above are warranted and that, consequently, the contrast in (2) cannot be explained away by arguing that Goldberg's (1995) Unique Path Constraint only applies to Type A. Broccias (2013) contends that the occurrence of multiple RPs is quite simply made possible by the existence of "tight links" between the RPs. For example, an event of spreading butter, see (2b), has the change in the configuration of the butter and the location where the butter ends up as two intrinsic and salient facets so that it is to be expected that both may be expressed in the same construction. By contrast, someone can be beaten black and blue without any physical motion along a path taking place; the links between the two resultative phrases in (2a) are therefore "loose" in that they do not depict a "typical" scenario.

Iwata (2014) replies to the charges made by Broccias (2013) trying to show that Broccias's objections do not hold up to scrutiny. It is thus my duty to reply to Iwata's (2014) criticisms, which can be shown to be either misguided or based on dubious arguments. For reasons of space, Iwata (2014) concentrates on just two issues, the conceptualisation of property change as a path and the notion of tight links. The latter issue, however, is also addressed in relation to the use of the phrase *to one's death* in cases such as *to jump to one's death off the castle*, where two apparently distinct paths, the physical descent and the change of state from life to death, co-occur, contrary to what one would expect on the basis of Goldberg's (1995) Unique Path Constraint.<sup>3</sup>

In what follows, I will address these issues in the order in which they are discussed in Iwata (2014). In Section 2.1, I will reiterate that path conceptualisation cannot be excluded for Type B resultatives by showing that the paraphrase for path conceptualisation employed in Iwata (2014) applies naturally also to some Type B examples. In Section 2.2, I will show that Iwata's (2014) criticisms of Broccias's (2013) notion of tight links is based on a series of paradoxes. Finally, in Section 2.3, I will provide further arguments against a metonymic analysis of the phrase *to one's death* in cases such as *to jump to one's death off the castle*, which Iwata (2014) uses to justify the co-occurrence of two apparently distinct paths. The overall conclusion will therefore be that Broccias's (2013) criticisms of Iwata (2006) can be upheld, *pace* Iwata (2014).

## 2. The criticisms

### 2.1. Path conceptualisation

As was pointed out above, essential to Iwata's (2006) analysis is the claim that "with Type B resultatives change of state is not conceptualised in terms of translational motion over a property path" (Iwata, 2006: 464). As is made clear in Broccias (2013), this means that if one can show that (a) either there exist Type B resultatives where change is conceptualised as a property path or (b) there exist Type A resultatives where change is not conceptualised as a property path, Iwata's (2006) approach is untenable because lack of property path change is a necessary, defining feature of Type B resultatives.<sup>4</sup> It is worth stressing that Iwata's (2006) model does not allow for any deviation from the claim that Type B resultatives lack

<sup>3</sup> This example is of neither Type A nor Type B since two prepositional, rather than adjectival, phrases are employed. Still, as is explained in Broccias (2013), this example is relevant to the notion of "tight links", which is not limited to adjectival phrases.

<sup>4</sup> It should also be observed, as is duly done in Broccias (2013), that Iwata (2006) is aware that the other defining property of Type B resultatives, i.e. the adjunct status of the resultative AP, is problematic. Iwata (2014) protests that "a definition [for the notion of "adjunct"] is given in Iwata (2006)". However, this is simply incorrect, see Broccias (2013: 35). Iwata (2006) just offers a confusing characterisation of what he means by "adjunct" by writing that "[in *He spread the butter thin on the bread*,] [*thin*] is syntactically not an adjunct. So the adjunct in my sense should not be confused with the adjunct as defined syntactically. Of course, this does not mean that the adjunct in my sense is totally unrelated to the adjunct as conceived in the GB tradition. [...] In this sense, my position is closer to that of Jackendoff (1990) and Goldberg (2002), both of whom admit that there are "argument adjuncts", which are syntactically adjuncts but semantically similar to arguments[...]" (Iwata, 2006: 462). Tellingly, Iwata (2008) refrains from using the label "adjunct" with reference to Type B resultatives. Since Iwata is unable to solve the issue of the syntactic/semantic status of the resultative AP, the issue of property path conceptualisation becomes paramount.

property path change, while Type A resultatives require property path change. Iwata's model is an either/or model. It would thus be sufficient to provide just one example for each Type where this is not the case to fault the model. Ultimately, the issue of path conceptualisation can only be resolved experimentally, i.e. through psycholinguistic investigation, but let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that it can be settled by relying on intuition alone.<sup>5</sup> The important point here is that if either of the two cases (a) and (b) mentioned above, not even necessarily both, is proven to be possible, then Iwata's (2006) theory cannot be upheld. It is a contention made in Broccias (2013) that both cases are indeed plausible.

As for case (a), Broccias (2013) considers the examples in (3) and wonders why *thin* should only evoke a property path in (3a), a Type A resultative, but not in (3b), a Type B resultative.

- (3) a. She pounded the metal thin.  
b. He cut the salami thin.

Iwata (2014) explains that

“[a] moment's reflection tells us that the property of being thin is achieved differently. In [(3a)] clearly the metal was not thin before being pounded. But as the pounding progresses, the metal becomes thinner, and finally it attains thinness. So the metal can be said to have traversed a property path, i.e. from being not thin (probably thick) to being thin.

By contrast, in [(3b)] nothing tells us about the former state that obtained before the cutting event. After all, the entity which *thin* is predicated of (=slice) did not exist before the salami was cut. Rather, the property of a slice being thin “emerges” exactly when the salami gets cut” (Iwata, 2014: 18).

Further, Iwata (2014) contends that the alternative formulations of (3b) in (4), where a path preposition, *into*, is used, are no proof of path conceptualisation because “[h]ere an identificational change, in the sense of Jackendoff (1983, 1990), coded by *into slices*, and a property predicated of the entity having undergone the identificational change, coded by *thin*, are confused” (Iwata, 2014: 19).

- (4) a. He cut the salami thin into slices.  
b. He cut the salami into thin slices.

Be that as it may, it is easy to see that Iwata's (2014) understanding of what counts as path conceptualisation would not be able to exclude other Type B examples. Consider (5) below:

- (5) Try to get a small amount of dough. Pinch and stretch the dough. If you were able to **stretch the dough thin** enough to let light pass through, ...  
(pinkbird.org/w/How\_do\_you\_make\_a\_good\_pizza\_dough)

Here, a verb which entails a change of state, *stretch*, is used<sup>6</sup> and it is clear that Iwata's wording for (3a) works perfectly for (5) as well. Making the necessary changes to Iwata's analysis of (3a), one can surely say that “in (5) clearly the dough was not thin before being stretched. But as the stretching progresses, the dough becomes thinner, and finally it attains thinness. So the dough can be said to have traversed a property path, i.e. from being not thin (probably thick) to being thin.”<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, path conceptualisation cannot be ruled out in Type B resultatives. Conversely, it is possible to show that Iwata's lack of path conceptualisation is not restricted to Type B resultatives. Consider the “minimal pair” in (6) mentioned in Broccias (2013), where (6b) is Type A resultative.<sup>8</sup>

- (6) a. He punched him to death.  
b. He punched him dead.

(6b), unlike (6a), may depict a scenario where the change of state was punctual, e.g. the referent of the pronominal object ended up dead instantaneously after having been punched once. Can one really say that the instantaneous change from life to death in (6b) is conceptualised as a property path change as envisaged by Iwata (2006)? Notice that a formulation like the one suggested by Iwata (2014) for (3a) cannot be used here. Surprisingly, Iwata's (2014) reply to this set of examples is a

<sup>5</sup> It is also scientifically suspect to claim that Type B resultatives do not involve property path change if this conclusion is reached only on the basis of the data which need to be explained, i.e. if no “independent” data are appealed to.

<sup>6</sup> For example, the *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English* defines *stretch* as “to make something bigger or looser by pulling it, or to become bigger or looser as a result of being pulled” ([http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/stretch\\_1](http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/stretch_1)).

<sup>7</sup> It is also apparent that this formulation can be extended to other Type B cases such as *He painted the wall red* which is also commented on in Iwata (2014). Iwata (2014) points out, following a reviewer's comment, that ““He painted the wall red” does not imply that before the wall becomes red it must have been non-red, because there is nothing wrong with “He painted the wall red, as it had been before.” This observation may be taken to be evidence arguing against a property-path analysis of red in Broccias' account” (Iwata, 2014: 19). Nevertheless, *He painted the wall red* can surely be used for cases where the wall was not initially red. Under such circumstances, a paraphrase along the lines of that used by Iwata (2014) for (3a) would work fine provided that we interpret what becomes redder as the amount of surface being covered in red. This shows that path conceptualisation cannot be excluded when the original colour was not red.

<sup>8</sup> The reader should remember that (6a) does not belong to either Type A or Type B because the two Types discussed by Iwata (2006) only contain adjectival RPs while a prepositional RP occurs in (6a).

non-sequitur as Iwata (2014) claims that Type A resultatives are possible with punctual verbs – and (6b) would thus be one such example – but he does not address the issue of whether path conceptualisation, as understood by Iwata, is resorted to in such cases.

In sum, Iwata (2014) fails to show convincingly that path conceptualisation is always excluded in Type B resultatives and that path conceptualisation is always operative in Type A resultatives. To reiterate one of the conclusions in Broccias (2013), lack of clear evidence as to the (un)availability of path conceptualisation means that Iwata's (2006) theory rests on problematic grounds.<sup>9</sup>

## 2.2. Tight links

Since Iwata's (2006) model is built on shaky foundations, Broccias (2013) claims that the contrast in (2) between \**Sam kicked Bill black and blue out of the room* and *He spread the butter thin on the bread*, should be explained without resort to the notion of path property change. Broccias (2013) contends that in (2b) “the two RPs are tightly linked, i.e. they refer to (or specify) two intrinsic facets of the same common event” (Broccias, 2013: 47) and this allows for the simultaneous occurrence of the two RPs. An event of spreading has the location where the event takes place or, alternatively, the place where the substance being spread ends up as a very salient feature<sup>10</sup>; at the same time, whether the resultant spread is thin or thick is also a very salient feature of the event. By contrast, as was observed in Section 1, the event of simultaneously kicking someone black and blue and out of the room does not depict a typical scenario.

Let us now consider how Iwata (2014) tries to refute this analysis based on “tight links”. First, Iwata (2014) states that the notion of “tight links” originates from Iwata himself<sup>11</sup> and, further, he claims that this notion is not defined so it is of no use, see Iwata (2014: 22). This line of reasoning by Iwata (2014) is therefore quite puzzling. On the one hand, Iwata (2008) appeals to the notion of “tight links” to account for the contrast in (7)

- (7) a. \*The box arrived open. (meaning: arrival caused the box to open)  
b. Her robe fell open to the waist.

since he writes that

“[a]nother reason why the examples cited by Goldberg [such as (7a)] sound so bad comes from the fact that the physical motion and the change of state are so unrelated to each other that they cannot be combined into a single conceivable scene. [. . .] In contrast, in [*Her robe fell open to the waist*] a change of state is a direct consequence of a physical motion, be it translational or internal.”

(Iwata, 2008: 1077)

On the other hand, when Broccias (2013) tries to use allegedly Iwata's notion of “tight links”, then Iwata (2014) contends that this cannot be done because the notion has not been defined properly. In sum, it is ok if Iwata uses the (allegedly ill-defined) notion of “tight links” but it is not if Broccias does so.

Second, Iwata (2014) claims that the notion of “tight links” “is another way of saying that verbs that occur in the Type A resultative (i.e. verbs which do not lexically encode a change) never allow for multiple occurrences of a result phrase”, see Iwata (2014: 22). This is, in fact, a conclusion drawn solely by Iwata (2014) and which Broccias (2013) never mentions, also because Broccias (2013) does not subscribe to Iwata's (2006) bi-partite adjectival analysis in the first place. Rather, this conclusion is what Iwata's (2006) approach demands of Type A resultatives so that, in effect, Iwata (2014), by admitting that Type A resultatives may contain multiple RPs as he does in his (2014) paper (see below), is dealing a blow to his approach. Paradoxically, however, he tries to defend himself by blaming the shortcomings of his model on Broccias. Remember that, as was observed at the outset in Section 1 with reference to (2a), \**Sam kicked Bill black and blue out of the room*, Type A resultatives code path property changes so they cannot contain physical path RPs. This would result in a violation of Goldberg's Unique Path Constraint. By saying that multiple RPs can be found with Type A resultatives, Iwata (2014) is negating his (2006) explanation for the impossibility of (2a).

<sup>9</sup> In his discussion of path conceptualisation, Iwata (2014) also contains some reiteration of the alleged shortcomings of the diagrams proposed by Broccias (2003) and Broccias (2013) to capture the semantic pole of the resultative construction. Since the crucial point here is the feasibility of property path conceptualisation rather than its diagrammatic representation, I have chosen to omit further discussion of this issue, also because this would require considerable space.

<sup>10</sup> Notice, incidentally, that if we take *on the bread* as a locational phrase rather than a goal phrase, then *on the bread* would not count as an RP.

<sup>11</sup> Among the charges made by Iwata (2014) against Broccias (2013) is the claim that “[i]t is a fact that before Iwata (2006), the very notion that with some resultatives the verbal event and the change of state are co-extensive and co-temporal had not been duly recognised by Goldberg (1995), Boas (2003), or Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004), let alone Broccias (2003) (Levin being the sole exception).” This statement by Iwata (2014) is however incorrect. Iwata (2014) ignores, for example, the work by Wechsler (2005 [2001]) on “homomorphism”, which is duly discussed in Broccias (2003). Furthermore, despite Iwata's (2014) protestations to the contrary, the issue of temporality figures prominently in Broccias (2003), being one of the main features of what Broccias regards as the (prototypical) Event Change Schema. Tellingly, the example *The mansion burned down* which is mentioned in Iwata (2014) in relation to this point occurs in Broccias (2003) in a section entitled “temporal coextensiveness”. It thus remarkably peculiar that Iwata (2014) manages to conclude that temporal coextensiveness, despite being one of the main features of Broccias's Event Change Schema, “does not play any significant role in Broccias (2003)”, see Iwata (2014: 22).

Further, it is also worth considering the examples, from the British National Corpus, see Iwata's (2014) examples (24) and (25), which he uses to support his claim that multiple RPs are possible with Type A:

- (8) a. He wiped the blade clean on his skin coat and walked out.  
 b. Afterwards he washed the tin out in the stream, splashed water over his face and hands and wiped them dry on a handkerchief.  
 c. The lad on its back, dolled up as King William, had been crushed to death against the wall.

There are several problems with these data. First, *on his skin coat* in (8a) and *on a handkerchief* (8b) are obviously not RPs since they refer to locations where the two events of wiping take place, i.e. they are locative phrases rather than goal phrases, using traditional terminology. Second, (8c) is not relevant because Iwata's (2006) approach only deals with AP resultatives while here a PP resultative, *to death*, is employed so it is not clear why this example is brought to bear on the issue. Third, even if the examples in (8) were relevant (i.e. assuming they contain genuine RPs), Iwata (2014) would have worked himself into a vicious circle here. His explanation, see Iwata (2014: note 4), is that "[...] the *clean* and *dry* in *He wiped it {clean/dry}* are the result phrases that are to be accommodated by means of a fixed string analysis [i.e. the Type A analysis, CB], but those in [(8a) and (8b)] are to be accommodated by means of an AP-addition analysis [i.e. the Type B analysis, CB]." But *He wiped the blade* and *He wiped his hands* do not entail a change of state, so (8a) and (8b) cannot be treated as Type B examples and, indeed, Iwata (2014) himself had paradoxically classified them as Type A resultatives when he introduced them. So not only does Iwata (2014) use questionable examples to make his claim that Type A resultatives can occur with multiple RPs, but, if the examples provided were indeed relevant, he would solve the problem of having Type A resultatives with multiple RPs – which should be impossible vis-à-vis Goldberg's Unique Path Constraint – by conveniently reclassifying them as Type B instances.

### 2.3. *Fall to one's death*

Another major bone of contention related to the issue of "tight links" is the analysis of example (9).

- (9) The tyrant ordered them to jump to their death off the castle.

At stake here is the viability of the notion of "tight links" as an explanation for the fact that in (9) two different paths seem to be activated, one being the physical path off the castle and the other being the change of state from life to death. This would appear to be a violation of the Unique Path Constraint, which does not allow multiple paths in different landscapes. Iwata (2006) and Iwata (2014) follow Goldberg's (1991) argument that "*to her death* is an idiom which metonymically stands for "the place where she died"" (Iwata, 2014: 24). I will now provide further evidence for the fact that the metonymic analysis defended by Iwata is problematic.

First, for some unclear reason, Iwata (2014) criticises Broccias (2013) because the phrase *to her death* does not always appear in examples where physical motion is related causally to death. Iwata concedes that causality can be detected in (9) but points out that no causality is present in (10), which reproduces Iwata's (2014) example (32a).

- (10) He walked to his death at Reading on 7 July 1896, the famous hangman Billington in charge of operations.

But nowhere does Broccias (2013) claim that death is always the result of physical motion. Broccias (2013) just states that this is the case in (9) so that examples such as (10), whether causal or not, do not bear on Broccias's (2013) argument that Goldberg's/Iwata's metonymic analysis cannot be maintained in (9).

Second, the implausibility of a truly metonymic analysis has also been pointed out independently by Matsumoto (2013). He observes that

"[i]f [*to one's death*] means 'to the place one dies' one would expect one can say [(11)], but this is unacceptable.

- [(11)] a. \*He threw himself from the balcony to his death, the place later visited by many of his followers.  
 b. He threw himself from the balcony to his death, a death that was sad to everyone." Matsumoto (2013: 10).

Third, Broccias (2013) observes that also unexpected is the fact that the source domain for the alleged metonymy (e.g. *the ground*) can occur side by side with the alleged metonymic target (*death*), as in (12):

- (12) ... the bomber instead chose to leap from the balcony's rail to his death on the ground below.

Iwata (2014) dismisses such examples as (12) claiming that *on the ground* is a location PP not a goal PP (cf. *onto the ground*, instead) so that *on the ground* cannot be the metonymic source for *to his death*. Apart from the fact that Iwata is confusing metonymy as a conceptual phenomenon with its syntactic realisation (i.e. whether the PP contains preposition *on* or preposition *onto*) and that the claim that *on the ground* is a location PP and not a goal PP could be

debated,<sup>12</sup> Iwata (2014) must concede that goal PPs are indeed possible, as in (13) (example (13a) is Iwata's (2014) example (41a) and example (13b) is Iwata's (2014) example (42)):

- (13) a. As the sun shrank the ledge, he waited to plunge to his death into a crevasse.  
b. "You sent Bob to Trinidad, to his death –"

This is potentially problematic because if one contends, as Iwata (2014) does, that e.g. *to his death* is metonymic for *into a crevasse* in (13a), then both the metonymic source and the metonymic target would simultaneously be expressed. Iwata (2014) claims that this, however, is not a problem for the metonymic analysis because

"it has been well-known since Gruber (1976) that more than one goal phrase may appear as in [(14)].

- [(14)] a. John sent the message to New York to Bill.  
b. John sent the message from New York to Philadelphia to Bill." (Iwata, 2014: 27).

It is easy to see, however, that examples such as [(14)] do not provide any support for Iwata's (2014) metonymic analysis. They quite simply have to do with the fact that multiple goals are possible if they are used to zoom in on the goal, i.e. Bill is "contained within" New York in (14a), for example. Instead, no zooming in takes place with e.g. *to one's death* and *into a crevasse* in (13a).<sup>13</sup> The two prepositional phrases depict two different facets of the same event, one being the falling into the crevasse and the other being the ensuing death. Iwata (2014) treats the goal PP and *to one's death* as equivalent but this, as was pointed out above, is problematic because clear-cut metonymic examples should allow reference to the metonymic source via the metonymic target, see (11), and should suppress the metonymic source in favour of the metonymic target.<sup>14</sup>

Fourth, Iwata dismisses programmatically the importance of example (15) below by claiming that he cannot "see the relevance of [(15)], as [(15)] does not involve *to one's death*" (Iwata, 2014: 24).

- (15) Wingman daredevil falls from 37,000 feet . . . into the history books.

Let me thus spell out the relevance of (15) to the ongoing discussion. (15), like (9) above, describes a scene where reaching the ground has implications for the subject referent within another conceptual landscape. In (9), the physical path correlates with the subject referent's death; in (15), the physical path correlates with the subject referent's entering into the history books. Can one say that *into the history books* is metonymic for reaching the ground? I believe that a more plausible analysis of examples such as (9) and (15) should invoke conceptual blending in the sense of Fauconnier and Turner (2002). In (9), the physical descent is mapped onto the metaphorical conception of life as a journey. In particular, we conceptualise dying as motion from life to death so that falling can be projected onto journeying from life to death. No one is objecting that the place reached by the subject referent can be construed as the place of death,<sup>15</sup> but this is not a metonymic relation (at least in the traditional sense); it is a correlation stemming from the mapping of physical motion onto metaphorical motion from life to death. The correlation is due to the fact that the two types of motion are tightly linked, i.e. are different manifestations of the same event within two different conceptual landscapes. Similarly, in (15), the physical descent is mapped onto the metaphorical conception of one's becoming famous as a path into the history books. The physical goal, the ground placed 37,000 feet below from the launch point, is replaced with the metaphorical goal *into the history books* but this is not metonymy; it is a cross-domain mapping between two conceptual landscapes. If nothing else, this operation is more similar to metaphorical mapping, where two distinct domains are involved, than metonymic mapping, where only one domain is activated. (9) and (15) thus share similar conceptual operations and exhibit tight links in the sense that in both cases the goal phrase hints at an another salient feature of the events being depicted within another conceptual landscape. In (9) falling causes death and in (15) falling through the distance of 37,000 feet guarantees entering into the history books.

<sup>12</sup> Contrary to what Iwata (2014) claims, cases where the "locational" PP precedes the *to one's death* phrase can be found, e.g.

(i) As he said his last words, he fell on the ground to his death. (<http://shinichiwolfe.tripod.com/id1.html>)

Notice also that in connection with examples such as (2b), Iwata (2006) claims that *on the bread* is a RP, i.e. a goal phrase, rather than a locative phrase.

<sup>13</sup> Nor is the order of the PPs fixed as in (14b), cf. \*John sent the message from New York to Bill to Philadelphia (vs. the acceptable *to Bill in Philadelphia*). Further, the preferred order in cases such as (13a) seems to be *to his death into a crevasse* rather than *into a crevasse to his death*, as a cursory Google search may reveal (3340 vs. 122 hits, respectively, were obtained for the two phrases on the 10th March 2014). This is precisely the opposite of the order observed in (14a) if any notion of "containment" is appealed to (e.g. the death occurred inside the crevasse).

<sup>14</sup> Iwata (2014) also advances the suggestion that in cases such as (12) *on the ground* is a modifier of *death*. But notice that at least in the case of (i), the alleged head *death* (or, rather, *to her death*) can be removed and the resulting sentence is still felicitous.

(i) a. She fell to her death on the rocks below. (based on Iwata's (2014) example (48))  
b. She fell on the rocks below.

This is not what one would expect if *on the rocks below* were a modifier since a modifier cannot occur on its own, independently of its head. Even more importantly, if metonymy were indeed involved, how could the metonymic target be modified by the metonymic source if they have the same reference?

<sup>15</sup> I am using the term "construal" because the person who fell may actually have died some time after the fall, in hospital for example.

### 3. Conclusion

In this short paper, I have defended the claims made by Broccias (2013) against Iwata (2006). In particular, I have argued that Iwata (2014) is not able to show convincingly that path conceptualisation is to be excluded from Type B resultatives and, vice versa, that path conceptualisation is always active in Type A resultatives. Further, Iwata (2014) is not able to refute the notion of tight links, not only because he himself makes recourse to it in Iwata (2008) but also because this notion is needed for the analysis of the phrase *to one's death*, which cannot be explained in metonymic terms. Finally, Iwata (2014) even claims that Type A resultatives may appear with multiple RPs, thus contradicting his own approach, which predicts the impossibility of multiple RPs in Type A. The arguments presented here, together with the more detailed analyses in Broccias (2013), show that Iwata's (2006) bipartite adjectival model cannot be upheld and that a more flexible model, based on blending operations and the highlighting of multiple facets within complex scenes, is needed.

Let me conclude by saying that I do not intend to further intervene in this debate since I have made my position clear here as well as in Broccias (2013); nor do I want scientific debate to turn into a parochial dispute or heated point scoring. I just hope that my reaction to Iwata's claims may result in a better understanding of resultative constructions.

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