Falling to one’s death in multiple landscapes

Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of *He fell to his death* as a possible counterexample to Goldberg’s (1995) Unique Path Constrain, which bans simultaneous motion in multiple landscapes in caused motion/resultative constructions. Iwata (2014a, 2014b) contends that this example is not an instance of the resultative construction and that, as *to his death* is metonymic for the place where one is presumed to have died, the occurrence of simultaneous motion in multiple landscapes (downward movement and metaphorical motion into one’s death) is, in any case, apparent. This paper argues, instead, that the example at hand instantiates the resultative construction and that motion in multiple landscapes cannot be explained away in metonymic terms. Rather, our ability for blending intimately connected facets of a complex event and the satellite-framed nature of English are held to be decisive factors.

*Keywords:* resultative, metonymy, multiple landscapes, Unique Path Constraint, active zone, billiard-ball model

1. Introduction

A recent controversy between Broccias and Iwata (see Broccias 2013, 2014 and Iwata 2014a, 2014b) concerns, among other things, the analysis of the example in (1):

Three main questions arise in connection with it.

Firstly, does (1) code motion in multiple landscapes (see Goldberg 1995 on the use of this term)? This seems intuitively to be the case. *Fell* describes downward motion in physical space (or landscape). *To his death*, instead, points to motion in another landscape, a metaphorical one, where dying is conceptualized as telic motion (A CHANGE OF STATE (to die) IS A CHANGE OF PLACE), as is signalled by the dynamic preposition *to*. Although Broccias (2013, 2014) claims that multiple landscapes are accessed, Iwata (2014a, 2014b) seems to suggest that this is not really the case.

Secondly, can *to his death* be classified as a resultatives phrase (see Beaver 2012, Broccias 2003, Goldberg 1995, among many others)? In other words, can death be interpreted as the result of the action of falling? Broccias (2013, 2014) argues that this is indeed so, while Iwata (2014a) disputes this view.

Thirdly, can *to his death* be analysed as a metonymic phrase, as was originally suggested by Goldberg (1991)? Under such an analysis, *to his death* would stand for “the place where one dies” or “is presumed to die”, as is also argued by Iwata (2014a), *contra* Broccias (2013).

The interconnectedness of these three questions and their further ramifications will become apparent from the detailed discussion below, which elaborates on Broccias (2013, 2014), who dismisses the role of metonymy in the analysis of (1).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deals with the question of whether multiple landscapes are accessed in (1). Section 3 discusses whether *to one’s death* can be categorized as a resultative phrase. Section 4 tackles the issue of whether a

(1) He fell to his death.
metonymic analysis of to one’s death is warranted by considering a number of criteria, namely, the degree of access to the alleged metonymic target (Section 4.1); possible metaphoric interpretations of death (Section 4.2); which metonymy type to one’s death could be taken as an instantiation of and how the alleged metonymic target can be “revealed” syntactically (Section 4.3); whether conflicts in reference (zeugma) are relevant to the metonymic classification of to one’s death (Section 4.4); what the analysis of examples related to (1) that differ from it in terms of either the verb or the PP used can tell us about Iwata’s metonymic approach (Section 4.5). A summary of the various strands of evidence discussed in Section 4 is offered in Section 4.6. More evidence is discussed in Section 5, which highlights the importance of interlinguistic variation in the analysis of (1). Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusions.

2. Multiple landscapes

As was briefly remarked above, the interpretation of (1) rests on two “kinetic landscapes”, a physical one, where downward motion takes place, and a metaphorical one, where the event of dying is conceptualized as telic motion. Crucially, these two landscapes appear to be blended into a single construction, which refers simultaneously to both physical motion (a fall) and a change of state (to die). This is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1, which should be largely self-explanatory and is inspired by the blending diagrams of Fauconnier and Turner (2002). The event of falling and that of dying can be regarded as two input spaces
that are merged into a blend that contains elements projected from both. The entity undergoing the physical downward motion and the change of state is the same and is what the pronoun he refers to. The two types of motion, represented by means of the two arrows in the two input spaces, are merged together in the blend, where the physical target of motion, shown as the lower, light blue box in the fell input space, has been replaced by the target from the to one’s death input space, the solid red box standing for his death.

1 The generic space has not been shown in Figure 1. It would correspond to a diagram for motion without any specification as to its orientation (i.e. whether motion is horizontal or vertical) and nature (i.e. whether physical or abstract). It should also be observed that Figure 1 is a much simplified representation of the conceptual import of (1) because it does not show explicitly the metaphorical nature of death as telic motion. That is, to his death itself should be analysed as a blend of two input spaces, one pertaining to physical telic motion and the other to change of state. Further, it should be pointed out that the dashing and heaviness of the contour lines of the boxes are intended to represent their relative salience. Thus, the most salient location/state, death, is shown as the box with the heaviest contour lines. The contour lines for the two boxes in the fell input space, representing the source and target of motion, are lighter because both the source and the target of motion are less salient than the fate suffered by the referent of the pronoun he. Whereas death is mentioned explicitly in the syntax, the source and target are optional (e.g. He fell to his death (from the fourth floor), He fell to his death (into the crater)), see also Section 4.1. Finally, the contour lines for the source in the to his death input space would correspond to the state of being alive, which is not particularly salient – hence the dashed lines employed – in the sense that it is not expressed explicitly in the syntax.
There seems to be little doubt that, taken at its face value, (1) involves the simultaneous activation of two conceptual landscapes which are kinetic and telic. If this is indeed the case, then the existence of (1) may be problematic in the light of Goldberg’s (1995) Unique Path Constraint (UPC). According to the UPC,

[i]f an argument X refers to a physical object, then no more than one distinct path can be predicated of X within a single clause. The notion of a single path entails two things: (1) X cannot be predicated to move to two distinct locations at any given time t, and (2) the motion must trace a path within a single landscape (Goldberg 1995: 82).

In the case at hand, X is the entity referred to by the pronoun he, whose motion does not trace a path within a single landscape as two landscapes were argued to be involved. There is an important caveat, however. The UPC applies to both caused-
motion and resultatives constructions so that, if (1) is not a caused-motion/resultative construction, the UPC does not necessarily apply. This is precisely the line of reasoning appealed to by Iwata (2014a, 2014b) and will be explored in some detail in the next Section, where I will argue that *to one’s death* is a resultative phrase and so the UPC should apply.3

3. *To one’s death* is not a result phrase, or is it?

Although, intuitively, it is rather uncontroversial to claim the death results from a fall in (1), Iwata (2014a, 2014b) contends that this is not correct. His claim is based on a further constraint that resultatives are expected to satisfy, alongside the UPC. It is best to quote directly from Iwata’s (2014) analysis (it should be observed that Iwata uses the term “result phrase” instead of “resultative phrase”):

[… ] *to one’s death* significantly departs from true result phrases: It is well-known in the literature on resultatives that “the change of state must occur simultaneously with the endpoint of the action denoted by the verb,” [and this would not be the case in (1), CB] a constraint known as the Aspectual constraint in Goldberg (1995, p. 194). The only conclusion that can be safely drawn, therefore, is that *to one’s death* is not a result phrase (Iwata 2014b: 147).

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2 Iwata does not seem to distinguish between the caused motion and the resultative constructions. Hence, his use of the term “resultative” covers both cases.

3 The UPC has been subjected to scrutiny also by Matsumoto (2013), to whom I will return at the very end of this paper in Section 6.
Iwata (2014b) thus contends that (1) cannot be a true resultative because death does not (necessarily) occur simultaneously with the endpoint of the falling event. This contention rests on two key assumptions that need to be explored in more detail. Firstly, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by “result(ative) phrase”. Secondly, in the case of “true” resultatives, it must be shown that no counterexamples to the simultaneity constraint exist. These two tasks are taken on in the next two subsections.

3.1. The definition of result(ative) phrase

As was remarked above, Iwata uses “result” in “result phrase” to mean “resultative”. As the latter is the more current term, I will opt for it in the rest of the discussion. The classic definition of “resultative phrase” is to be found in Levin (1993), who defines it as “an XP which describes the state achieved by the referent of the noun it is predicated of as a result of the action named by the verb” (Levin 1993: 101).

If this definition is applied to (1), then the answer to one of the three questions posed at the beginning, namely whether to one’s death is a resultative phrase, is bound to be affirmative. The PP to one’s death, which instantiates the XP in the definition above, describes the state (death) achieved by the referent of the noun phrase is it predicated of (he) as a result of the action of named by the verb (fall). This is also apparent from cases such as (2):
(2) a. [H]e died from a fall from the fourth floor of a Holiday Inn balcony.  

b. A deadly fall from the fourth floor.

(2a) is semantically equivalent to *He fell to his death*. The use of the preposition *from* in *from a fall* in (2a) makes it clear that falling is construed as a cause for death.  

Similarly, *to fall to one’s death* can be nominalized into *a deadly fall*, as in (2b), which illustrates the “causing death, or fatal injury; mortal, fatal” meaning of the adjective *deadly*, see s.v. *deadly adj.* 4a in the *Oxford English Dictionary.*

Although *to one’s death* satisfies the classic definition of “resultative phrase”, Iwata suggests that *to one’s death* is not a “true” resultative phrase, because it occurs in a construction that violates the Aspectual Constraint on resultatives. On the face of it, this may appear to be a peculiar move. If additional constraints are needed to define a resultative phrase, then these should be part and parcel of the definition of what counts as a resultative phrase in the first place. Nevertheless, one could excuse the absence of the Aspectual Constraint from Levin’s definition as being due to advances in our understanding of resultativeness. The Aspectual Constraint is related to Goldberg’s (1995) work, which is, after all, subsequent to Levin’s (1993) definition. In spite of this, the next Subsection will try to show that there are no uncontroversial grounds for adding the Aspectual Constraint to the classic definition of resultative phrase.

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5 Of course, it could be argued that this cause is construed metaphorically as a locative source because of the use of the spatial preposition *from.*
3.2. The role of simultaneity

It is not difficult to come across rather uncontroversial instances of resultative constructions where the change of state does not occur simultaneously with the endpoint of the action denoted by the verb, *pace* Iwata (2014b) and Goldberg (1995). This point had already been made by Broccias (2003: 148-152), but it may be useful to repeat a few of the relevant examples, which appear in (3) and (4) below.

(3) [headline] Student stabbed to death

[text] He was treated by a paramedic and taken by helicopter to hospital, but he died soon afterwards.

*(The Guardian, 14th September 1999)*

(4)  a. He danced his feet sore.
    b. Sally talked her throat dry.
    c. Sally sprayed her skin soft.

It would be difficult not to analyse *to death* in (3) as a resultative phrase (see also Lemmens 1998: 25 for a similar example in Dutch). Still, the text of the article specifies that death occurred some time after the stabbing event took place. Similarly, in (4a), the feet probably began to be sore some time after the dancing event came to a close and, in (4b), Sally’s throat may have become dry some time after the event of talking came to an end. Even clearer is (4c), where the product used by Sally to make her skin soft must have taken some time to take effect so that simultaneity between the endpoint of the action of spraying and the change of state
does not hold. Not to classify these examples as resultatives, when they clearly describe states resulting from the verbal events, because they do not (necessarily) satisfy the Aspectual Constraint, would be bizarre, to say the least. Rather, it is important to separate the definition of resultative phrase from the Aspectual Constraint. In fact, it is easy to see where the Aspectual Constraint comes from and why confusion may arise as to its use by scholars such as Iwata as a parameter for the identification of resultatives. As is pointed out by Broccias (2003: 151), the Aspectual Constraint just paraphrases one of the features of the conceptual model underpinning the existence of the resultative construction, namely Langacker’s billiard-ball model (see e.g. Langacker 1991: 13). In this model, the interaction between entities is described in energetic terms so that the exertion of a force upon an object (e.g. by a billiard ball colliding with another) results in an immediate consequence (e.g. the impacted-upon ball moves). This is what the (transitive) resultative construction is all about. For example, in (4c) the two subevents of spraying one’s skin and the skin becoming soft are blended into a billiard-ball model conceptualization. Simultaneity pertains to the billiard-ball model conceptualisation, not to the temporal unfolding of the cause-effect chain in the “real” world. It thus does not seem relevant to the characterization of the notion of resultative phrase (in transitive resultative constructions) whether simultaneity in the real world obtains or not. The billiard-ball blend requires simultaneity but this is a matter of construal and may be at odds with the existence of a time lag in the real-world sequence of its constitutive subevents. Crucially, if simultaneity is irrelevant to the identification of transitive resultative constructions, then there is no reason why it should instead matter in intransitive examples such as (1).
In sum, on the basis of Levin’s (1993) classic definition and the role of construed vs. “objective” simultaneity in examples such as (3) and (4), it is safe to conclude, pace Iwata, that to one’s death in (1) is indeed a resultative phrase. Of course, this does not mean that to one’s death is always a resultative phrase, as will be observed in Section 4.5. But it is now necessary to investigate the third main question posed by (1), namely whether to one’s death can be analysed as a metonymic phrase.

4. To one’s death as a metonymic phrase

As was shown above, if to one’s death is treated as a resultative phrase, then a problem ensues in connection with the UPC because motion in two landscapes seems to take place in (1) and this is banned by the UPC. Nevertheless, even if is to one’s death is viewed as a resultative phrase, the violation of the UPC may turn out to be apparent rather than substantial. Iwata, like Goldberg (1991) before him, claims that to one’s death is a metonymic phrase that stands for “the place where one is presumed to die”. Iwata (2014b) writes:

But if to ones [sic] death is not a result phrase, what is it, then? Iwata (2014[a]) argues that death, being a deverbal noun, reifies a process (i.e. die). The reified process as a whole stands for the place where one is presumed to die.

The spatial location of a reified process is highlighted, yielding the interpretation “to a place where he is presumed to die.” In this sense, one’s
Death indeed metonymically stands for the place of his presumed death.

(Iwata, 2014[a], p. 27)

Thus *to one’s death* indeed metonymically stands for the place where one is presumed to die, in accordance with Goldberg (1991) (Iwata 2014b: 147).

It follows that, if *to one’s death* stands for a place, then metonymy guarantees motion in one landscape (the physical one) rather than two (the physical one and the metaphorical one) and, hence, no violation of the UPC ensues.

It must be observed, however, that Iwata contends that “*to one’s death* does not express a location alone, and in fact [Iwata 2014a] presents evidence for stating so: As a matter of fact, there is evidence that one’s death does not express a location pure and simple. First, death may be pluralized” (Iwata 2014b: 149). A relevant example is (5), where, obviously, a paraphrase along the lines of “the people jumped to the places where they died” would not make much sense because the place where the people are presumed to die is roughly the same for all of them. The plural *deaths* is simply due to the fact that more than one person suffers fatal consequences.

(5) The Valley Bridge […] became notorious for people jumping to their deaths.

(Iwata 2014b: 149, example (50b))

The behaviour exhibited by *to their deaths* in (5) may make one wonder whether *to one’s death* really points to a location after all (i.e. whether *to one’s death* is truly metonymic). For the sake of clarity, let us, first of all, assume that the whole PP *to one’s death* is the alleged metonymic source: as the first quotation from Iwata above
shows, Iwata is not clear whether the metonymic source is the PP *to one’s death* or just the NP *one’s death*. Next, one is faced with the task of exploring whether a metonymic analysis of *to one’s death* can be defended, in spite of examples such as (5), which show that a purely spatial interpretation is not (always?) plausible.

In order to come to a sound conclusion about the nature of *to one’s death*, it is first of all necessary to agree on what counts as a metonymy. Here, one can appeal to at least two recent definitions that occur in comprehensive analyses of this phenomenon. In a recent volume on metonymy, Barcelona (2011) defines metonymy as follows:

“[m]etonymy is an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” (Barcelona 2011: 52).

Another detailed, book-length treatment of metonymy is Bierwiczonek (2013), who claims that

“[m]etonymy is a process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, associated with it within the same single integrated conceptualization” (Bierwiczonek 2013: 16).

Despite the differences in wording, which do not need to concern us here, the two definitions both converge on the (rather obvious) idea that the metonymic target must be salient. Barcelona (2011) writes that the “[…] activated” and
Bierwiacone (2013) observes that metonymy “provides access to […] the target”. Similarly, Iwata speaks of highlighting (see the quotation from Iwata 2014a: 27 mentioned above: “The spatial location of a reified process is highlighted”). It is thus necessary to ask whether the alleged metonymic target (the place of one’s death) is indeed highlighted by the use of to one’s death. In what follows, in addition to discussing this, I will also consider other types of evidence that may bear on the issue of the metonymic analysis of to one’s death, namely metaphoric influences, metonymy type and target addition, literal meaning violation, relativization, verb variation, similarity to other PPs, and, finally, ecological motivation.

4.1. Access to the target

In order to introduce the issue of access to the alleged metonymic target, it may be instructive to consider the following still from a James Bond film (Skyfall) where a character by the name of Patrick “falls to his death”, as the caption says.
Intuitively, what the picture seems to highlight is not the location where Patrick will end up but, rather, the fact that he is falling from a very tall building so that one is left in no doubt about the fatal consequences of his fall. Although the confirmation (or rebuttal) of this intuition is left to experimental psychologists, further evidence of a more linguistic nature may convince the sceptical reader that to one’s death, as it is used in (1), does not highlight a location at all. In June 2015, two stowaways hid themselves in the wheel well of a plane due to fly from Johannesburg to London. As the plane approached London and deployed its landing gear, one stowaway fell out of the plane’s wheel well and his lifeless body was later found on a London office. This tragic news was reported in (at least) two alternative ways, which are reproduced in (6) and (7).

(6) Stowaway fell to death from plane on to London office after 8,000-mile flight.\(^7\)

(7) Stowaway dies after falling from plane on to London office after 8,000-mile flight. (The Guardian alert,\(^8\) 19th June 2015)

Note that (6) and (7) make up a sort of “minimal pair”. Fall is a matrix verb in (6) while it is the object of the preposition after in (7); death is the object of the

\(^6\) See http://jamesbond.wikia.com/wiki/Patrice (last access: 29/10/2016).
\(^7\) See http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jun/19/stowaway-fell-to-death-plane-london-shop-heathrow-richmond (last access: 29/10/2016).
\(^8\) The Guardian alert is a free smart phone service that alerts readers to major stories.
preposition *to* in (6) while its verbal cognate *die* is the matrix verb in (7). (6) and (7) are functionally equivalent and clearly show that *to fall to one’s death* does not mean “to fall to the place where one is presumed to die” but, rather, “to die after falling”. In other words, *to fall to one’s death* is not used to activate (using Barcelona’s definition of metonymy above) or access (using Bierwiczonek’s definition) or highlight (using Iwata’s characterisation) the location where one ends up dead. If the locative target needs to be activated/accessed/highlighted, this is done by means of a locative PP such as *on to London* in (6) and (7).

4.2. Metaphoric influences

At the very outset of this paper, it was claimed that (1) relies upon the metaphor **A CHANGE OF STATE (to die) IS A CHANGE OF PLACE**, as is signalled by the dynamic preposition *to*. On closer inspection, however, other metaphoric mappings may turn out to be relevant. For example, it is rather common to conceptualize death as an animate entity (the Grim Reaper comes to mind in this respect) and one may come across examples such as (8) and (9):

(8) How often had he leaned on that low stone wall, and read the strange inscriptions in various tongues over the graves of mariners from distant countries who had met with their death on this rocky coast?9

9 See [https://books.google.it/books?id=VLWuykTY_y4C&pg=PA190&lpg=PA190&dq=%22and +read+the+strange+inscriptions+in+various+tongues%22&source=bl&ots=_svsxdOl2C&sig=T2Z8UCQ_68Yh3siLUR3zFQZuvzQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwimjKC267zJAhU GqA4KJhc4-](https://books.google.it/books?id=VLWuykTY_y4C&pg=PA190&lpg=PA190&dq=%22and +read+the+strange+inscriptions+in+various+tongues%22&source=bl&ots=_svsxdOl2C&sig=T2Z8UCQ_68Yh3siLUR3zFQZuvzQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwimjKC267zJAhU GqA4KJhc4-)
(9) Marching into the jaws of death. Haunting Mail photo of troops launching doomed Afghan assault.\(^{10}\)

Although (8) and (9) do not contain the verb *fall*, they both evoke a kinetic scenario. In (8), the mariners end up on the rocky coast and death is metaphorised as a creature that one can meet. In (9), instead of a verb of vertical motion (*fall*), a verb of manner of motion (*march*) in the context of horizontal kinesis is employed. I will have to say more about this type of example later (see Section 4.5 below). For our present purposes, it suffices to observe that death is again conceptualized as an animate entity and a dangerous one at that. Examples such as (8) and (9) are important because they show that the metaphorisation of death as a (dangerous) creature may occur in motion scenarios. Thus, it makes sense to hypothesize that *to one’s death* in (1) activates further metaphoric mappings alongside a CHANGE OF STATE IS A CHANGE OF PLACE. That is, one cannot exclude that, by analogy with cases such as (8) and (9), *to one’s death* does not evoke the “personification” of one’s death in (1). In sum, even if metonymy in (1) were involved, as Iwata contends, metaphor may also play an important role, which is tantamount to claiming that *to one’s death* highlights death, not the place where one is presumed to have died.

4.3. Metonymy type and target addition

Although Iwata (2014b) contends that *to one’s death* is metonymic in that it stands for and highlights the “place where one is presumed to die”, he regards a substitution analysis of metonymy as discredited among cognitive linguists. In his view, *to one’s death* is not simply equivalent and hence replaceable with the “place where one is presumed to die”. He just claims, following for example Langacker (2008: 69), that metonymy involves a shift in profile. In the case at hand, *to one’s death* would involve a shift from death as a process to the spatial location where death occurs. Importantly, even ignoring the fact that it is rather dubious, as I tried to point out above, that *to one’s death* highlights the place of death, Iwata has nothing to say about the classification of *to one’s death* as a metonymy. He just denies the substitution view of metonymy. But it is important to relate *to one’s death* as a(n alleged) metonymy to the types recognised in the literature in order to further assess its alleged metonymic status.

In his comprehensive analysis of metonymy, Bierwicz (2013) recognises four types of metonymy: formal, referential, propositional and illocutionary. Illustrative examples for each type, from Bierwicz (2013), are offered in (10)-(13).

(10) Formal metonymy:

Fridge (for refrigerator)

(11) Referential metonymy:

The buses are on strike. (cf. “The bus drivers are on strike.”)
Propositional metonymy:

A: How did you spend the weekend?

B: Mary got some free tickets to the movies. (cf. “Mary and I went to the cinema.”)

Illocutionary metonymy:

I don’t know where the bath soap is. (cf. “Where is the bath soap?”)

If to one’s death is regarded as a metonymy, the type that it seems to fit best is the referential type. Formal metonymy does not involve a shift in profile; for example, both refrigerator and fridge refer to the same object. Propositional metonymy, see (12), uses a part of a script to refer to the whole script (e.g. buying tickets to a film for going to the cinema). This does not seem to the case in (1), where a part-whole relation is not obvious. Finally, (1) clearly does not relate to two illocutionary acts. The remaining option thus seems to be the referential type, which typically triggers a conflictual meaning, e.g. buses cannot literally be on strike in (11). This is indeed the case in (1), where one cannot literally fall to one’s death.

Linked to the question of which metonymy type (1) might instantiate is how the alleged metonymic target can be expressed. Although Iwata attacks the substitution theory of metonymy, it must clearly be possible to replace the source with the target in one way or another if a metonymy is used, since metonymy relies on the activation of a target. Crucially, with “clear” metonymic examples, the target can be “revealed” by modifying how the source is coded. For example, in the case of referential metonymy, the source may be replaced – this is the substitution view condemned by
Iwata – with the target as in (14), or the source may become a modifier of the target as in (15), or the target may be added as a complement of the source as in (16):

(14) a. Westminster backed airstrikes against Isis.
    b. The MPs backed airstrikes against Isis.

(15) a. The red shirts won.
    b. The players in the red shirts won.

(16) a. She drank a glass.
    b. She drank a glass of red wine.

In the case of (1), the alleged metonymic target can be expressed by means of a PP that either precedes or follows the PP to one’s death, as in (17) and (18), respectively (the alleged targets are underlined in these two examples).

(17) Two other friends […] fell to their deaths under Tube trains in separate incidents in 2010 and 2012.\textsuperscript{11}

(18) The body is discovered the next morning, and it is presumed the man fell into the hole to his death.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} See http://www.dailyrecord.co.uk/news/scottish-news/scot-young-death-russian-crime-4807798 (last access: 29/10/2016).

\textsuperscript{12} See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What%27s_the_Matter_with_Helen\%3F (last access: 29/10/2016).
Iwata (2014b) contends that in cases such as (17), the “the reified process [i.e. death, CB] may be modified by” a PP. He illustrates this point by means of examples such as (19).

(19) In the dark, panic-stricken by what she’d done, she ran down the wrong passage, towards the sea instead of towards the land, slipped and fell to her death on the rocks below. (From Iwata 2014b: 148, ex. (48).)

In other words, Iwata analyses on the rocks below as a modifier of her death in (19). This means that under Tube trains should be regarded as a modifier of their deaths in (17). Although this analysis may be on the right track for (17) and (19), it is clearly implausible for (18). Firstly, note that the alleged modifier (into the hole) precedes the PP (to his death) where the alleged modified element (his death) is found. Secondly, observe that a dynamic preposition (into) is used, which makes the analysis of into the hole as a modifier of his death problematic anyway (cf. his death into the hole vs. the more plausible his death in the hole). Clearly, into the hole is a dependent of fell not death in (18). This explains both its position before to one’s death and the use of the dynamic preposition into.

In conclusion, Iwata does not explain what type of metonymy to one’s death would instantiate. Because of the literal meaning violation observed in (1), which is what one typically observes with referential metonymy, the most likely metonymic type for (1) would be the referential type. However, the metonymic target cannot be “revealed” by using any of the strategies observed in connection with (14)-(16). Nevertheless, Iwata contends that the metonymic target can be expressed by means of a locational PP that modifies death, but, as example (18) shows, this analysis is
not always viable. Importantly, the observation concerning the impossibility of Iwata’s modifier analysis at least in cases such as (18), is independent of whether (1) is an instance of referential metonymy or not. (18) demonstrates that the alleged target (e.g. *into the hole*) can occur simultaneously and independently of the alleged source (i.e. *his death*). This, however, is not a hallmark of metonymy as is currently understood, which requires replacement or structural modification in order for the target to be “revealed”, as in (14)-(16) above. (17) and (18) are, instead, reminiscent of Langacker’s profile/active zone asymmetry (see Langacker 1990: 90), which is illustrated in (20):

(20)  a. Your dog bit my cat.
   
   b. Your dog bit my cat on the tail.

Langacker (1990) points out that while the nominal expressions *your dog* and *my cat* profile whole entities, only a part of the dog and a part of the cat were involved in the biting event, namely the dog’s teeth and, say, the cat’s tail, which is expressed explicitly in (20b) by means of the PP *on the tail*. Langacker calls the dog’s teeth and the cat’s tail active zones. These are the concepts that “participate directly in a given relation” (Langacker 1990: 190).

Crucially, although Langacker does not draw a clear distinction between active zones and metonymy, analysts such as Bierwiczonek (2013) differentiate between the two. In (20), for example, the part of the cat that is bitten (the active zone) is not salient but can be specified by means of a further PP (e.g. *on the tail*). Note that in (20) the active zone (the tail) can be brought to light simultaneously and independently of the “source” (the cat). This is similar to what is observed in (18),
where the PP *into the hole* makes explicit an otherwise “vague” location presupposed by the expression *to fall to one’s death*. In other words, *to one’s death* like my cat in (20) does not, on its own, provide access or highlight a target (i.e. the target is not salient) but, rather, presupposes a non-salient target that can be accessed or highlighted only through explicit mentioning.

4.4. Relativisation

The view that *to one’s death* in (1) is metonymic is also disputed by Matsumoto (2013). He claims that *to one’s death* in (1) cannot be analysed as a metonymy because relativisation fails, as is shown in (21), from Matsumoto (2013) himself:

(21) *He threw himself from the balcony to his death, the place later visited by many of his followers.*

It must be pointed out, however, that (21) does not provide conclusive evidence. (21) is akin to cases of zeugma, where two separate but related referents are accessed simultaneously by means of the same lexical item. Here, death could have both a state and a place as referents. Geeraerts and Peirsman (2011) observe, however, that zeugma involving metonymy is possible only with so-called target-in-source metonymies (see e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2003 on target-in-source and source-in-target metonymies), as is shown in (22).

(22) a. Linguistics is the biggest and most sympathetic department of the faculty.
b. *The whole department was made redundant and then torn down.

In (22a), the biggest is predicated of the metonymic source linguistics (i.e. the institution) while most sympathetic is predicated of the target (i.e. the people working in the institution). Crucially, in Geeraerts and Peirsman’s view, the target (the people domain) is contained within the source (the institution domain) so that (22a) counts as an instance of target-in-source metonymy. In (22b), two separate targets are intended to be accessed, “the people”, by means of made redundant, and “the building”, by means of torn down. As (22b) involves two different targets rather than the source plus the target-in-source, (22b) is not acceptable.

This has repercussions for (21) because, if (21) is regarded as involving a source-in-target metonymy (i.e. the death subdomain is “contained” within the place domain), then relativisation would be impossible anyway, given the possibility of zeugma only with target-in-source metonymy (on the assumption, of course, that relativisation and the use of ellipsis as in (22) work in the same way). Still, it may be difficult to decide a priori whether the alleged metonymy to one’s death for to one’s place of death can be conceptualized in terms of containment, i.e. whether the death domain (the alleged source) can be characterized as being contained within the place domain (the target), a source-in-target metonymy, or whether the place domain (the target) can be characterized as being contained within the death domain (the source), a target-in-source metonymy. Importantly, in the former case, even if to one’s death were a metonymy, Matsumoto’s (2013) point would not apply because of the constraint on zeugma mentioned above. On the other hand, if to one’s death were a target-in-source metonymy, then (21) should be possible.
4.5. Verb variation

So far I have tried to argue that to view *to one’s death* in (1) as a metonymy is problematic. This does not mean that a metonymic analysis for *to one’s death* is necessarily implausible in all cases. For example, if the kinetic scenario involves horizontal rather than vertical motion, as was the case in (1), then a metonymic analysis may be more feasible. A few examples are offered in (23) to (27).\(^{13}\)

(23) Manchester police deaths: Lured to their deaths in an 'act of pure evil'

[headline]

Two female police officers were murdered in cold blood after being lured into an ambush and gunned down in the worst atrocity against the police for almost half a century.\(^ {14}\)

(24) Nepal blizzards: Trekkers 'herded to deaths', claims survivor. [headline]

A British survivor of a Himalayan storm which killed at least 29 people has claimed trekkers were "herded to their deaths" by ill-equipped guides.\(^ {15}\)

\(^{13}\) Similar examples are to be found in Iwata (2014a). However, he does not relate them explicitly to horizontal motion and concludes that these metonymic examples (but see the text above for more discussion of the use of this term for such instances) show that *to one’s death* is always metonymic, which I have tried to argue is not in the case of vertical motion with the verb *fall*.


(25) Marched to their deaths: Sickening ISIS slaughter continues as 250 soldiers captured at Syrian airbase are stripped then led to the desert for mass execution.\(^\text{16}\)

(26) According to Scott’s diary, before Oates exited the tent and walked to his death, he uttered the words ”I am just going outside and may be some time.”\(^\text{17}\)

(27) As he walked to his death he looked up at the window of the chamber in which Laud was confined, and saw the archbishop waiting for him there.\(^\text{18}\)

Just to illustrate, in (23) a paraphrase along the lines of “the two police officers were lured to their place of death” (but note that the plural deaths needs to be replaced by the singular death) would work fine and this also holds true of the remaining examples. Despite this, the observations made above in connection with (1), namely the fact that the alleged metonymy to one’s death does not seem to highlight the (alleged) locative target – what is highlighted is obviously death – and the fact that the (alleged) target, if expressed, cannot always be analysed as a modifier of death but rather as an argument of the verb, stand. Thus, even in (23)-(27), an active zone analysis turns out to be more plausible than a metonymic analysis. The location where death occurs can be “revealed” by adding a locative phrase such as to the desert in (25); otherwise, the location remains non-salient. Finally, it is worth pointing out that in these cases of horizontal kinesis, to one’s death cannot be


\(^{17}\) See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lawrence_Oates (last access: 29/10/2016).

\(^{18}\) See https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=144727170X (last access: 29/10/2016).
categorized as a resultative phrase in the sense that the verb does not express the cause of death. Still, motion in multiple landscapes occur and this must be accounted for.

4.6. Other prepositional phrases

Although this paper deals with the phrase to one’s death to investigate motion in multiple landscapes, other phrases can be recruited to do so. Consider, for example, (28), where murder instead of death is found:

(28) Six people, including a 15-year-old girl and three other teens, were arrested Tuesday in the murder of 15-year-old Florida boy Seath Tyler Jackson, who was lured to his murder by text message.19

A similar phrase conveying the notion of disappearance/death is the phrase to oblivion, which is used in the following headline, reporting on the plane crash in the French Alps caused by a Germanwings pilot in March 2015:

(29) Descent to Oblivion: The Death Wish of a Germanwings Co-Pilot.20

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More interesting, however, is the PP to safety. Although the OED characterizes the use of safety in this phrase as “[t]he state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; freedom from danger” (see s.v. safety, I.1.a), the Longman Dictionary of the English Language paraphrases to safety as “to a place of safety” (see http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/safety, sense 4), thus apparently advocating a metonymic analysis. The examples given in the latter dictionary include the following:

(30)  a. Thirty thousand people fled to the safety of the capital.
     b. Firefighters led the children to safety.
     c. They reached safety seconds before the bomb went off.

As is evident from (30c), the locative meaning can also be found with the noun safety on its own, without the directional preposition to. Despite the paraphrase offered in the dictionary, a profile/active zone analysis is also appropriate here because safety, on its own, does not highlight the location attained but, rather, the state (of safety) one ends up in. The location arrived at can be coded in a variety of ways. In (30a), it is expressed by means of the dependent PP the capital, an option which is not possible with death. Other options include patterns that were already observed for death, as is shown in (31) (the relevant patterns have been underlined).
(31) a. For seeing his forces routed, Triarius took all the able-bodied men from among the survivors and fled to safety in Roman-controlled Cappadocia.  

b. As Henry's commissioners approached the castle, Sir John fled to safety to Skipton Castle whilst Adam attempted to evade the King's agents by hiding on Witton Fell.

c. [H]e flies the Tardis alongside her cab, and she leaps inside to safety.

d. Ridge School in Takoradi, the port where she first stepped ashore to safety.

In (31a), the PP in Roman-controlled Cappadocia could be analysed as a modifier along the lines of Iwata’s proposal. By contrast, in the remaining examples, the locative phrase is clearly an argument of the verb. The dynamic preposition to is used in (31b) and the adverbial expressions inside and ashore precede to safety in (31c) and (31d). As was argued above, with the exception perhaps of (31a), these patterns would be unusual as means of “revealing” the metonymic target.

Continuing the exploration of PPs other than to one’s death that are used to evoke motion in multiple landscapes, one can come across instances of motion where a

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21 See https://books.google.co.uk/books?isbn=1429904372 (last access: 29/10/2016).
22 See http://www.castlesfortsbattles.co.uk/bolton_castle.html (last access: 29/10/2016).
24 See http://www.unilcr.org/print/3b66ce692.html (last access: 29/10/2016).
25 In fact, this observation may also extend (in part) to the PP headed by of in (30a). Although this pattern is found in She drank a glass of wine, it is important to observe that a similar option is also possible with profile/active zone expressions. For example, in The dog bit the cat, the active zone can be “revealed” by using a genitive form, as in The dog bit the cat’s tail. Admittedly, however, the active zone example involves a shift in the nominal head from cat to tail while the safety of the capital does not.
metonymic analysis is clearly implausible, even more so than with to one’s death. Consider (32), which is also mentioned in Broccias (2013):

(32) Wingman daredevil falls from 37,000 feet […] into the history books.²⁶

This headline is about a wing suit jumper who broke the record for the longest, farthest and highest wing suit jump. (32) combines motion in two landscapes, one is the physical landscape and the other is the metaphorical landscape where, as in (1), A CHANGE OF STATE (to become famous, here) IS A CHANGE OF PLACE. Obviously, it makes no sense to claim that into the history books in (32) stands for the location reached by the jumper. Rather, the conceptual justification for (32) is of a metaphorical nature, as was the case in the examples discussed above. Becoming famous is conceptualized as motion “into the history books” and metaphorical motion and actual vertical motion are blended in (32).

A similar example is (33), where it makes no sense to claim that to victory stands for the finishing line. If anything, it is the (reaching of) the finishing line that stands for victory.

(33) Mark Cavendish got his first Tour de France success in almost two years as he sprinted to victory on stage seven.²⁷

²⁷ See www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/33492240 (last access: 29/10/2016).
4.7. Interim conclusion

I have shown that motion in multiple landscapes cannot be explained away by invoking metonymy. If a metonymic analysis is appealed to, then one cannot fail to note that there are (a) cases such as (32) and (33), where into the history book and to victory are used respectively, that are not amenable to such an analysis; (b) cases that may be metonymic only under certain circumstances (viz. to one’s death with verbs of horizontal motion); (c) cases such as to safety in (30) for which a (potentially) metonymic analysis appears to be viable. This variability clearly shows that metonymy cannot be the conceptual justification for the occurrence of motion in multiple landscapes. Further, I have pointed out two serious issues with Iwata’s metonymic analysis. Firstly, there is no obvious sense in which the prepositional phrase used “highlights” (using Iwata’s terminology) the (alleged) metonymic target. In fact, in cases such as to victory in (33), it is the attained location that seems to provide access to victory. Secondly, the alleged target can be added to the alleged source without any structural modification of the former, which is not what is typically found in clearly metonymic examples. On balance, the evidence suggests that a more appropriate analysis for the cases at hand, even those that are at first sight “metonymic”, should invoke Langacker’s profile/active zone asymmetry as understood by Bierwiczonek (2013). Having highlighted the importance of the profile/active zone asymmetry, as well metaphor in Section 4.2, still does not solve the puzzle of the existence of examples coding motion in multiple landscapes. This issue is addressed in the next Section.
5. Ecological motivation

Although (1) may look “exceptional” in that motion in two landscapes is evoked, (1) is in fact, pace Iwata, a rather run-of-the mill member of the family of caused motion and resultative constructions. As is well-known from Talmy’s work (e.g. Talmy 2000), the wider use of these constructions in Germanic languages such as English than, for example, in Romance languages is to be related to the satellite-framed nature of the former versus the verb-framed nature of the latter. While languages such as English, German and Swedish typically encode the manner of motion by means of the main verb and the path of motion by means of a satellite or adjunct (e.g. *Sally limped into the room*), languages such as French and Italian typically encode the path of motion by means of the main verb and the manner of motion by means of a satellite (e.g. Italian *Sally entro nella stanza zoppicando*, lit. “Sally entered into the room limping”). This characterization can also be extended to resultative cases (assuming that the two constructions can be distinguished), where the verb expresses the means or manner by which a certain state, as specified by a PP or an AP, is attained (e.g. *Sally rocked the bay to sleep, Sally wiped the table clean*).

Obviously, the distinction between satellite and verb-framed languages should be interpreted as a general tendency rather than a hard and fast rule implying that the patterns found in one type of language are not to be found in the other type. Thus, as we have already seen, alongside (1), we also find examples such as (2a), repeated here as (34) for the sake of convenience, where the result (death) is coded through the verb and the cause/means is coded through an adjunct (*from a fall*):

(34) **[H]e died from a fall from the fourth floor of a Holiday Inn balcony.**
Alongside intralinguistic evidence, interlinguistic comparison is quite instructive here because it reveals the nature of (1) as a typical instance of the caused motion/resultative family. Let us consider how the tragic event mentioned in Section 4.1 was reported in the news in two other Germanic languages (German and Swedish) and two Romance languages (French and Italian):

(35) Blinder Passagier stürzt mutmaßlich aus Flugzeug in den Tod.28 (German)
    “(lit.) Stowaway falls apparently from aircraft into the death.”

(36) En fripasagerare [sic] föll mot döden från ett British Airways-plan.29
     (Swedish)
     “(lit.) A stowaway fell into the death from a British Airways plane.”

(37) Un passager clandestin fait une chute mortelle après s’être agrippé à un Boeing 747 sur plus de 12,000 km – mais un autre a survécu.30 (French)
     “(lit.) A stowaway makes a deadly fall after clinging to a 747 Boeing over more than 12,000 km – but another has survived.”

29 See www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article20994101.ab (last access: 29/10/2016).
(38) Un passeggero clandestino muore cadendo da un aereo della British Airways.\textsuperscript{31} (Italian)

“(lit.) A stowaway dies falling from a British Airways aircraft.”

While German and Swedish, like English, depict the event of dying in motion terms, French expresses the consequence of the fall by means of the adjective mortelle (“deadly”, see also (2b) above for English), which modifies the noun chute (“fall”), and Italian expresses the result by means of the tensed verb muore (“dies”) and the cause by means of the verbal adjunct cadendo (“falling”).

In sum, this interlinguistic evidence shows that we are justified in treating (1) as a member of the caused motion/resultative family, contra Iwata, and that to interpret to one’s death as a metonymy is rather suspicious. Both intralinguistic and interlinguistic data point to the fact that to one’s death just highlights death, not the place of one’s death.

6. Conclusions

At the outset, I posed three questions concerning (1), namely (a) whether (1) involves motion in multiple landscapes, (b) whether to one’s death is a resultative phrase and (c) whether to one’s death is a metonymic phrase standing for “the place where one is presumed to die”. I have argued that motion in multiple landscapes is indeed evoked in (1) and that to one’s death is clearly a resultative phrase in (1), while this

\textsuperscript{31} See \url{http://www.ecolibero.it/2015/06/un-passeggero-clandestino-muore-cadendo-da-un-aereo-della-british-airways/12159} (last access: 29/10/2016).
may not be the case in other instances where verbs other than *fall* are used (e.g. with *walk* in (27)). Finally, I have tried to show that a metonymic analysis of *to one’s death* is problematic and that this phrase is better analysed as an instance of Langacker’s profile/active zone asymmetry. More generally, even interpreting metonymy in a broader sense (so as to include active zones) and considering PPs other than *to one’s death*, I have pointed out that motion in multiple landscapes maps onto a metonymic continuum, from cases such as *to safety*, which are easy to interpret as evoking a locative target, through cases such as *to one’s death*, where a locative target is probably activated only under certain circumstances (e.g. with horizontal kinesis) to cases such as *into the history books*, which are clearly not metonymic. This shows that metonymy (however broadly construed) cannot be the explanation for the “exceptional” status of (1): motion in multiple landscapes does not necessarily rest on metonymy (broadly construed). Rather, the occurrence of (1) hinges on the satellite-framed nature of English and our ability to reason metaphorically so that different landscapes can be blended together. Crucially, in (1), falling and dying are two different but strongly correlated facets of a complex event. This observation is not dissimilar from the conclusion that Matsumoto (2013) arrives at concerning the simultaneous occurrence of spatial and non-spatial phrases in caused motion/resultative constructions such as *I sliced the cheese into thick pieces into the bowl*, where both physical motion (*into the bowl*) and metaphorical change (*into thick pieces*) are evoked, which also constitutes a violation of the UPC. He argues that violations of the UPC are possible “when [the spatial and non-spatial phrases] are a part of a single line of the development of a change” (Matsumoto 2013: 26). This is exactly what we observed in connection with (1), even though this example contains only one non-spatial phrase and motion is expressed by means of
the verb: falling and dying are intimately related and constitute a single line of change. Our ability to evoke and manage multiple landscapes simultaneously if they are intimately connected, coupled with the satellite-framed nature of English, is what allows for the existence of (1). This intimate connection is probably what Iwata and Goldberg have in mind when they talk of “metonymy” in connection with (1), but to explain (1) away in metonymic terms results in classificatory and conceptual problems and should thus be avoided.

References


Oxford English Dictionary (available at [www.oed.com](http://www.oed.com)).